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PAGE 01 GENEVA 05067 011902Z

43

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TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG

SUBJ: CSCE POLICY: OPTIONS FOR MOVING TOWARD DECISION ON STAGE III TIMING

REF: GENEVA 4953

1. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE TIMING FOR STAGE III HAS NOW REACHED A CRUCIAL PHASE. THE IMPERATIVES OF TIME, BOTH FOR THE FINNS IN HELSINKI AND FOR THE COMPLETION OF SUBSTANTIVE WORK IN GENEVA, ARE RAPIDLY CLOSING IN, AND WE BELIEVE A DECSION WILL HAVE TO BE MADE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS ON WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WISHES ON ITS OWN TO INFLUENCE MOVEMENT TOWARD A CONFERENCE CONSENSUS TO HOLD STAGE III DURING THE WEEK OF JULY 28. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL BE TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF OUR EC-9 AND NATO ALLIES. WHILE SUCH A DECISION WOULD PRESERVE THE PRINCIPLE OF NATO SOLIDARITY, IT WOULD ALSO EXPOSE US TO THE RISK OF HAVING CHANCES FOR A JULY 28 SUMMIT SLIP AWAY DUE TO THE INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS OF ONE OR MORE OF OUR ALLIES TO TAKE THE DECISIONS NECESSARY TO BRING STAGE II TO ARAPID CONCLUSION.

2. THE STATE OF OPINION AMONG NATO MEMBERS REMAINS AS DESCRIBED IN RECENT MESSAGES. A NEW DEVELPMENT IS A CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 05067 011902Z

NOTICEABLE HARDENING OF THE POSITION OF THE FRG. WEST

GERMAN DELEGATION CHIEF BLECH ADMITED DURING A NATO HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON JULY 1 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS BECOMING MORE CAUTIOUS ON THECHANCES OF A JULY CONCLUSION. IN ADDITION TO REMAINING PROBLEMS IN THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION, THE WEST GERMANS ARE APPARENTLY BECOMING DISCOURAGED BY DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING WITH THE GDR ON AN ACCEPTABLE GERMAN TRANSLATION OF CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS. WARY OF GROWING POLITICAL DEBATE OVER CSCE RESULTS AT HOME, THE WEST GERMANS APPEAR TO BE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE ON THIS POINT, WHICH HAS, OF COURSE, CAUSED THEM CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN PAST INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS.

- 3. THE DANGERS AS WE SEE THEM ARE AS FOLLOWS:
- --EVEN IF MOST NATO MEMBERS AGREE IN COMING DAYS TO ACCEPT A JULY 28 DATE FOR STAGE III, A FEW ALLIES SUCH AS TURKEY, THE NETHERLANDS OR THE FRG COULD APPEAL TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY TO BLOCK NATO AGREEMENT ON THE DATE.
- --SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS BY A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, EAST AND WEST, COULD SO SLOW DOWN PROGRESS ON THE TEXTS THEM-SELVES THAT CONCLUSION OF STAGE II DELIBERATIONS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE BEFORE JULY 28, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ON A DATE FOR STAGE III OR NOT. ON THIS QUESTION, THE POINT OF NO RETURN IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING. IF THE PACE OF DISCUSSIONS IS NOT ACCELERATED SOON, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO COMPLETE ALL THE TEXTS IN TIME.
- 4. CONCERNING THE FIRST POINT ABOVE, WE SEE THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS FOR US TACTICS:

A. MOVE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF JULY STAGE III INDEPENDENTLY OF OUR ALLIES -- THIS OPTION WOULD HAVE THE MOST DECISIVE EFFECT ON CONFERENCE THINKING AND WOULD PROBABLY PIN DOWN STAGE III FOR JULY 28. IT WOULD DELIGHT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES, THE FINNS, MANY NEUTRALS AND EVEN ONE OR TWO OF OUR SMALLER ALLIES. HOWEVER, MOST OF OUR ALLIES WOULD REGARD IT AS PULLING THE RUG OUT FROM UNDER THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ACCEPTABLE RESULTS ON THE LAST REMAINING ISSUES. IN ADDITION, THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 05067 011902Z

PRESS WOULD PROBABLY INTERPRET SUCH ACTION AS A US-SOVIET EFFORT TO PUSH RELUCTANT SMALLER NATIONS INTO SOMETHING THEY ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO ACCEPT.

B. MOVE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF JULY STAGE III WITH THE MAJORITY OF OUR ALLIES -- UNDER THIS OPTION WE WOULD NOT WAIT FOR FULL NATO CAUCUS AGREEMENT, BUT WOULD MOVE WHEN MOST OF OUR ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO DO SO.

AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THIS WOULD PROBABLY OCCUR WHEN THE CBM PARAMETER ON SOVIET BORDER ZONE IS AGREED AND THE QRR SENTENCE HAS BEEN FULLY ACCEPTED. AT THAT POINT FRANCE, UK, CANADA, DENMARK, NORWAY, ITALY, ICELAND, LUXEMBOURG, GREECE AND PORTUGAL WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO A STAGE III DATE. BUT TURKEY AND THE NEGHERLANDS WOULD STILL BE HOLDOUTS, POSSIBLY JOINED BY THE FRG AND BELGIUM. THIS OPTION WOULD STILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE STAGE III IN JULY, AND THUS THE SOVIETS WOULD UNTIMATELY BE SATISFIED WITH IT. MOST OF OUR ALLIES WOULD ALSO BE PLEASED, BUT THOSE WHO ARE STILL DRAGGING THEIR HEELS OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE UNHAPPY.

C. MOVE TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF JULY STAGE III ONLY WHEN ALL OF OUR ALLIES AGREE -- IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ALL OF OUR ALLIES WILL BE AGREED ON STAGE III TIMING UNTIL IT IS TOO LATE TO HOLD IT IN JULY. THE TURKS ARE THE MOST LIKELY TO BLOCK EARLY AGREEMENT ON TIMING, BUT THEY COULD BE JOINED BY THE DUTCH, AND POSSIBLY ALSO BY THE FRG AND BELGIUM. THUS THIS OPTION WOULD MEAN GIVING UP THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING STAGE III IN JULY, WITH THE NEXT AVAILABLE DATE PROBABLY NOT BEFORE OCTOBER. THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND MIGHT BRING DELAYS IN THE US-SOVIET BILATERAL SUMMIT AS WELL AS OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD GIVE MORE TIME TO IRON OUT THE MANY RE-MAININGPROBLEMS IN CSCE. AND THUS WOULD BE WELCOMED BY THE TURKS, AND POSSIBLY BY THE DUTCH AND THE FRG. WE DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE APPRECIATE BY ANYONE ELSE.

5. WE ARE INCLINED TO EXCLUDE OPTION A BECAUSE OF ITS POSSIBLY VERY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON SOME OF OUR ALLIES. CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 GENEVA 05067 011902Z

WE WOULD ALSO EXCLUDE OPTION C BECAUSE THE RISKS FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE TOO GREAT, AND THE BENEFITS TOO SMALL. OPTION B ALSO HAS DISADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF TIS EFFECT ON A FEW ALLIES, BUT WE BELIEVE THESE ALLIES WILL UNDERSTAND OUR DESIRE TO MOVE WITH THE MAJORITY. OUR PREFERENCE IS THEREFOR CLEARLY FOR OPTION B, AND WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT BE PREPARED TO AUTHORIZE US TO FOLLOW THIS OPTION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, SINCE IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT CONDITIONS FOR DOING SO WILL OCCUR VERY SHORTLY.

6. CONCERNING THE SECOND POINT RAISED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A LACK OF URGENCY ON THE PART OF A NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS ABOUT CONCLUDING THE SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. FOR ALL THEIR PRESSURE IN THE

COORDINATING COMMITTEE, NOT EVEN THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES SEEM INTERESTED IN PUSHING SUBSTANTIVE WORK FORWARD AT A RAPID RATE. IF IT IS DECIDED THAT WE DEFINITELY WISH TO SEE THE SUMMIT HELD ON JULY 28, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CONFERENCE WORK CONTINUES TO STAGNATE, WE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTIONS WE CAN UNDERTAKE TO STIMULATE A MORE RAPID CONCLUSION OF STAGE II WORK. DALE

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